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  This study examines the relationship between earnings management and information 
asymmetry based on some companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange over the period of 2005-
2010. The study only uses qualified samples by taking into account all limitations and 
necessary criteria. Based on the results of this survey, we can conclude that there is not a 
significant relationship between earning management and information asymmetry in Tehran 
Stock Exchange. There is also not a significant relationship between low or high earning 
management and information asymmetry. Estimated dividend announcement has information 
content and it can influence on information asymmetry. Finally, in Tehran Stock Exchange, 
there is information asymmetry and after dividend announcement, its value is more than before. 
© 2012 Growing Science Ltd.  All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction 
Accounting plays an important role on controlling costs and revenues, it helps take necessary actions 
on time and keeps track on managerial actions. A big portion of accounting information is in terms of 
financial statements and they are the primary sources of different users such as potential investors, 
financial analysis and decision makers. One of the effective factors in decision-making is to access 
the relevant and proper information with decision subject and they also need to be gathered, properly.   
 
The other condition in perfect competition is transparency in information and lack of it causes 
possible frauds. With some bias, information transparency is like information asymmetry and this 
could happen for example when some people have the access to some information while others do 
not. In many countries, in order to protect small investors, there are some laws and regulations, which 
require publicly traded firms to make their financial statement open to everyone at the same time. 
When there is a lack of transparency on financial information, retail investors normally gets hurt 
more severely than financial institutions who own a big chunk of stock shares.  In such   2538
circumstances, many small investors prefer to leave investing on stock market or they may be 
unwilling to invest since they are under the impression that they always know less than many 
important people do. This will create liquidity issue since small investors play important role on 
increasing the number of shareholders.  
 
As a result, the information asymmetry has undesirable and different consequence such as increased 
transaction costs, weakness of market, low liquidity, and reduction in profits from trading in capital 
market. Regulations related to financial disclosure can modify the consequences of reduction of 
information asymmetry. Market efficiency is one of the important issues influencing the capital 
market, which means that information affects on stock prices. This information is the estimated 
annual earnings and company’s dividend announcement. When there are sufficient levels of 
information on the market, there will be a less chance on having information asymmetry. Asymmetric 
distribution of information among individuals can cause different results than the single issue. If there 
is asymmetry in the stock market, a large numbers of shareholders may exit from the market. Leaving 
large numbers of low informed shareholders from the stock market will reduce trading volume and 
liquidity and it will reduce incentives to produce information.  
 
2. Background  
 
Empirical research that has recently been studied considers the effect of dividend announcement on 
the bid-ask spread. According to conducted studies on 25 companies, Morse and Ushman (1983) 
performed a comprehensive study on the bid-ask spread changes after dividend announcement. 
According to information asymmetry model, information asymmetry leads to increase the bid-ask 
spread (Copeland & Galai, 1983; Glosten &  Milgrom, 1985). Kyle (1985), Easley and O’Hara 
(1992) founded that when information asymmetry increase, trading volume will increase too. 
 
There are other observation, which indicates there is a significant changes in the bid-ask spread after 
the dividend announcement, only when important information from company was not released within 
30 days after dividend announcement. Patell and Wolfson (1991) claimed that the bid-ask spread will 
increase after dividend announcement. Skinner did not observe significant increase in the bid-ask 
spread about dividend announcement time schedule (Skinner, 1991). By using daily information, Lee 
et al. (1993) provided some evidences that the bid-ask spread in the period after the dividend 
announcement during one day have more expansion from before dividend announcement.  Based on 
the model developed by Kim and Verchia (1994), dividend announcement will increase trading 
volume and information asymmetry.  
 
There are some other studies on security market activities before dividend announcement (Demski, & 
Feltman, 1994; Mc Nichols, & Trueman, 1994). According to Mac Nicholas and Trueman (1994), 
before the dividend announcement, we will witness a high level of information asymmetry.  Krinsky 
and Lee (1996) reported that dividend announcement could increase information asymmetry.   
According to Yohn (1998), there are factors, where traders encourage to gather more information. He 
founded that there was a positive relationship between variability of profits and market reaction to 
unexpected earnings with changes in the bid-ask spread before dividend announcement. Hence the 
bid-ask spread has rising trend in before, announcement day and after it. 
 
Acker et al. (2002) reported little difference in the bid-ask spread and increase in trading volume 
about dividend announcement time. Libby et al. (2002) performed a survey on active companies in 
Toronto Stock Exchange and reported that the bid-ask spread had been increased before dividend 
announcement. Ghaemi and Vatanparast (2010) considered the role of accounting information in 
reducing of information asymmetry. They studied levels of information asymmetry and its impact on 
stock price and trading volume in 21 days after and before estimated dividend announcement. The 
results showed that there was information asymmetry in Tehran Stock Exchange and the amount of M. Hassani and F. Taheri / Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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information asymmetry after dividend announcement is more than amount of information asymmetry 
before dividend announcement (Ho & Stoll, 1981). Ahmadpour and Rasa'ian (2006) considered 
relationship between risk criteria and the bid-ask spread in Tehran Stock Exchange. In this study, 
information related to 14 independent variables were studied. The result included all the independent 
variables and could explain more than 68 percent change in the bid-ask spread. Khodamipour and 
Ghadiri (2010) considered accruals and information asymmetry. Their results showed that there was a 
significant and positive relationship between irregular accruals and information asymmetry. 
Nevertheless, the results did not show a significant relationship between absolute value of total 
accruals and information asymmetry. Ahmadpour (2010) considered relationship between accrual 
quality and information asymmetry. They showed that accrual quality of listed companies in Tehran 
Stock Exchange did not have a significant effect on information asymmetry. Ghaemi et al. (2010) 
considered the effect of seasonal dividend announcement on information asymmetry. They concluded 
that after seasonal dividend announcement, information asymmetry did not decrease significantly in 
studied period. 
 
3. Research Hypotheses 
 
Research hypotheses were designed as follows: 
 
1. There is a significant relationship between earnings management and information asymmetry. 
1-1.There is a significant relationship between low earnings management and information 
asymmetry. 
1-2.There is a significant relationship between high earnings management and information 
asymmetry. 
2. There is a significant difference between information asymmetry in companies with high earnings 
management and companies with low earnings management. 
3. There is a significant difference between information asymmetry after dividend announcement and 
information asymmetry before dividend announcement. 
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
In this section, we present details of our empirical study on the effects of information asymmetry on 
earning based on the survey accomplished on selected stocks on Tehran Stock Exchange. In order to 
test the first hypothesis we use is correlation test.  First, the bid-ask spread is calculated 21 days 
before and 21 days after dividend announcement. Then for each sample, the bid-ask spread of before 
dividend announcement is deducted from the bid-ask spread after dividend announcement. By using 
of their means, the bid-ask spread is calculated. Next, the current accruals is calculated for each 
sample and the earned estimation error is used to determine earnings management for related sample 
by calculating estimation error from the difference between current accruals and estimated accruals 
for each sample.  
 
When the estimated error is less, earnings management is also low and vice versa. On this basis, we 
have calculated estimation error and determined their medians. We expect that when the estimated 
error is greater than median errors, there is higher earning management and vice versa. The 
relationship between earnings management (low or high) and information asymmetry is studied using 
correlation test. 
 
Second hypothesis shows presence or absence of significant difference between information 
asymmetry in companies with high earnings management and companies with low earnings 
management. For doing this, average t-test is used. Fist, companies are divided into two groups   2540
namely low earnings management and high earnings management. Then t-test is done between 
amounts of information asymmetry in above groups.  
 
Third hypothesis shows presence or absence of significant difference between information asymmetry 
after dividend announcement and information asymmetry before dividend announcement. For doing 
it, average t-test is used. First, the information asymmetry is calculated in before and after dividend 
announcement and then the average t-test is performed between amounts of information asymmetry 
in above two periods. 
 
5. Research Samples 
 
This study is performed in Tehran Stock Exchange listed companies from 2005 until the end of 2010. 
By applying some conditions and limitations, qualified samples were selected as studied samples. 
Therefore, the following scheme is used to select samples:  
 
1. Companies must be productive. 
2. Companies must be listed in Tehran Stock Exchange before 2005. 
3. Companies must be in group of active companies or at least in study period, they must be active.  
 
Therefore, it was decided that 21 days before and 21 days after the declaration of estimated dividend 
is selected as an index for active companies. 
 
6. Research Variables  
 
6.1. Information Asymmetry 
 
Information asymmetry is a qualitative concept. To be able to express it in numbers, a model is 
needed to quantify it. For doing it, the bid-ask spread is used. According to Venkatesh and Chiang 
(1986), this model to determine the bid-ask spread is as follows, 
 
Bid-Ask Spread = (AP – BP) / ((AP + BP)/2) *100 
 
Bid-Ask Spread:  proposed price range of buying and selling of shares  
AP (Ask Price): Average selling price of shares 
BP (Bid Price): Average buying price of shares 
 
To do the calculations, the best proposed buying and selling price of shares are extracted for 21 days 
before and after estimated dividend announcement. The purpose of the best proposed selling price is 
the highest price for share sold per day and the purpose of the best proposed buying price is the 
lowest price for share bought per day. Then by using of their average, the Bid-Ask spread is 
calculated. 
 
6.2. Earnings Management 
 
For calculating earnings management, the adjusted model of Decho and Dicho (2002) is used: 
 
ß4 ΔREVi,t+ ß5 PPEi,t + εi,t    TCAi,t = ß0 + ß1 CFOi,t-1+ ß2 CFOi,t + ß3 CFOi,t+1 +   
 
TCAj,t: Total Current Accruals 
CFO: Operational Cash Flow 
ΔREVj,t: Change in Net Sale from t-1 to t 
PPEj,t : Gross value of Property, Plant and Equipment 
 
TCAi,t =ΔCAi,t – ΔCLi,t – ΔCashi,t + ΔSTDEBTi,t   
ΔCA: Change in Current Assets 
ΔCL: Change in Current Debts 
 
Δ Cash: Change in Cash 
ΔSTDEBT: Change in Current Share of Long term Debts M. Hassani and F. Taheri / Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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First, the current accruals is calculated for each sample and then the earned estimation error is used to 
determine earnings management for related sample by calculating estimation error from the 
difference between current accruals and estimated accruals for each sample.  
 
7. Statistical Analysis  
 
7.1.Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 shows some of the descriptive information associated with the proposed study. Note that, in 
our study, there are 287 observations and  Skewness and Kurtosis coefficients of all variables show 
that all variables had asymmetry and disproportionate distribution. The results are provided in Table 
1. In addition, correlation Coefficients are listed in Table 2. 
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
ΔCA    ΔCL    ΔCash    ΔSTDEBT    CFO    ΔREV    PPE    B-SPREAD    A-SPREAD      
2.33  2.73    8.18    1.58    3.982    3.439    4.656    0.05799   0.148825   Mean  
2.98   2.63   9.08   1.04   4.933   3.821   7.206   0.013930   0.085880   Median   
1.0554   1.227   1.091   8.2605    1.0568    1.3114   1.241   0.152615   0.217633   Std. Dev   
1.507   1.86   2.14    8.566   1.24   1.627   1.542   0.023   0.047   Variance   
6.204   8.675   7.652   7.691   7.998   6.686   9.089  3.513   2.226   Skewness   
66.150   91.474   78.813   78.813   44.611   53.245   106.753   15.724   11.016   Kurtosis   
 
Table 2  
Correlation Coefficients 
A-SPREAD    B-SPREAD    PPE    ΔREV    CFO    ΔSTDEBT    ΔCash    ΔCL    ΔCA   
                1   ΔCA  
              1   0.848   ΔCL  
            1   0.215   0.09   ΔCash  
          1   0.006   0.725   0.851   ΔSTDEBT  
        1   0.760   0.032   0.595   0.664   CFO  
      1   0.476   0.572   0.113   0.781   0.685   ΔREV  
    1   0.462   0.894   0.679   0.133   0.667   0.693   PPE  
  1   -0.015   -0.059   -0.025   -0.029   -0.034   -0.36   -0.032   B-SPREAD   
1   0.416   -0.063   -0.093   -0.085   -0.061   -0.026   -0.076   -0.069   A-SPREAD  
ΔCA: Change in Current Assets, ΔCL: Change in Current Debts, ΔCash: Change in Cash, 
ΔSTDEBT: Change in Current Share of Long term Debts, CFO: Operational Cash Flow, ΔREV: 
Change in Net Sale, PPE: Cost of Property, Plant and Equipment, B-SPREAD:Bid-Ask Spread before 
dividend announcement, A-SPREAD: Bid-Ask Spread after dividend announcement. 
 
7.2. Inferential Statistics 
 
We have used regression analysis to test all hypotheses. One of the conditions of regression analysis 
is normalizing data. To this end, first normalizing data related to the accruals was studied by 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Because earned sig is higher than 0.05 for all years, so the distribution of 
accruals is normal for all years. The result is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3  
Normality Test of Accruals 
Result   Sig    Kolmogorov-Smirnov   Year    Variable   
Normal Distribution  0.255   2.757   2005-2010    Accruals     2542
Then normalizing data related to the Bid-Ask Spread was studied by using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
In this test, obtained sig is higher than 0.05, so thus normalizing the data was confirmed (Table 4). 
Table 4  
Normality Test of the Bid-Ask Spread 
Result   Sig    Kolmogorov-Smirnov   Year    Studied variable   
Normal Distribution  0.118   1.391   2005-2010    Bid-Ask Spread   
 
8. Test of Hypotheses 
 
8.1. Test of First Main Hypothesis 
 
This hypothesis indicates that there is a significant relationship between earning management and 
information asymmetry. To test this hypothesis, Pearson correlation test, with error 0.05 was carried 
between obtained estimate error for tested companies and amount of their information asymmetry. In 
this test, obtained sig is higher than 0.05, so there was no significant relationship between two 
variables. The result is shown in table 5. 
Table 5  
Test of First Main Hypothesis 
Hypothesis  Level  Number of 
sample 
Pearson 
Correlation  Sig  Result 
Main   0.05  287  0.031  0.6  There is not a significant relationship between earning 
management and information asymmetry. 
 
8.1.1. Test of First Sub-Hypothesis 
 
This hypothesis indicates that there is a significant relationship between low earnings management 
and information asymmetry. To test this hypothesis, Pearson correlation test, with error 0.05 was 
carried between obtained estimate error for the companies have low earnings management and 
amount of their information asymmetry. In this test, obtained sig is higher than 0.05, so there was no 
significant relationship between two variables. The result is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6  
Test of First Sub- Hypothesis 
Hypothesis  Level  Number of 
sample 
Pearson 
Correlation  Sig  Result 
First  
Sub-hypothesis  0.05  144  0.050  0.555  There is not a significant relationship between 
 low earnings management and information asymmetry. 
 
 
8.1.2. Test of Second Sub-Hypothesis 
 
This hypothesis indicates that there is a significant relationship between high earnings management 
and information asymmetry. To test this hypothesis, Pearson correlation test, with error 0.05 was 
carried between obtained estimate error for the companies have high earnings management and 
amount of their information asymmetry. In this test, obtained sig is higher than 0.05, so there was no 
significant relationship between two variables. The result is shown in table 7. 
Table 7  
Test of Second Sub- Hypothesis 
Hypothesis  Level  Number of 
sample 
Pearson 
Correlation  Sig  Result 
Second  
Sub-hypothesis  0.05  142  - 0.070  0.404 
There is not a significant relationship between 
high earnings management and information 
asymmetry. M. Hassani and F. Taheri / Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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8.2. Test of Second Main Hypothesis 
[ 
This hypothesis indicates that companies with high earnings management have higher information 
asymmetry than companies with low earnings management. To test this hypothesis, with error 0.05, 
two-sample t-test was used, between bid–ask spread in companies with low and high earnings 
management. For this purpose, normalizing the data was confirmed by using Kolmogorov–Smirnov 
test. Because obtained sig is higher than 0.05, so data is normally distributed. Then equality of 
variance based on Fisher statistics was done. The result is shown in Table 8 and based on it, equality 
of variance can be accepted.  
Table 8  
Test of Variances Equality 
Hypothesis  Level  H0    F-statistic  Sig  Result 
Second  
Main-hypothesis   0.05   
2
1 = σ   
2
1  σ    0.828  0.364 
2
1 = σ   
2
1  σ  
Also T-statistics is 0.592. So, H0 is accepted with 95% confident coefficient. It can be concluded that 
there is not a significant difference between bid–ask spread in these 2 groups (Table 9).  
Table 9  
Test of Second Main-Hypothesis (Test of Means Equality) 
Hypothesis  Level  H0    T-statistic  Sig  Result 
Second  
  0.05  μ1= μ2    0.592  0.554 
μ1= μ2: There is not a significant difference between 
information asymmetry in companies with high earnings 
management  and companies with low earnings management. 
 
8.3. Test of Third Main Hypothesis 
 
This hypothesis indicates that there is a significant difference between information asymmetry after 
dividend announcement and information asymmetry before dividend announcement. For test this 
hypothesis, average test was carried out between bid–ask spread in before and after dividend 
announcement. The results showed that the bid–ask spread after the dividend announcement are 
significantly more than the bid–ask spread before the dividend announcement. In another words, the 
information asymmetry after the dividend announcement, is more than the amount of information 
asymmetry before dividend announcement. The result is shown in Table 10. 
Table 10  
Test of Third Main-Hypothesis 
Hypothesis  Level  H0    T-statistic  Sig  Result 
 
Third  
 
0.05  μ1= μ2    - 7.15  0.027 
μ1 ≠ μ2 There is a significant difference between information 
asymmetry after dividend announcement and information 
asymmetry  before dividend announcement. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
The result showed that earnings management of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange had no 
effect on information asymmetry. This result is largely consistent with results of other scientists such 
as Khodamipour and Ghadiri (2010) and Ahmad Pour Kasegari and A'jam (2010). Also, there was not 
a significant difference between information asymmetry in companies with high earnings 
management and information asymmetry in companies with low earnings management. However, 
there was a significant difference between information asymmetry in before dividend announcement 
and information asymmetry in after dividend announcement. These results showed that estimated 
dividend announcement had information content and it can affect on information asymmetry. 
Therefore, after dividend announcement, the amount of information asymmetry is higher than   2544
information asymmetry before dividend announcement. These findings are in agreement with Morse 
and Ushman (1983), Kyle (1985), Venkatesh and Chiang (1986), Patell (1991), Skinner (1991), Lee 
and Mucklow and Ready (1993), Kim and Verchia (1994) and Acker (2002). On the other hand, these 
results are not in agreement with the findings of Vatanparast (2006), Ghaemi et al. (2010), Easley and 
O’Hara (1992), Mc Nichols and Trueman (1994), Demski and Feltman (1994), Krinsky and Lee 
(1996), Yohn (1998), Libby and Mathew and Trueman (2003). 
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